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Are There Environmental Benefits from Driving Electric 
Vehicles? The Importance of Local Factors†
By Stephen P. Holland, Erin T. Mansur, Nicholas Z. Muller,  
and Andrew J. Yates*
We combine a theoretical  discrete-choice model of vehicle purchases, 
an econometric analysis of electricity emissions, and the AP2 air 
pollution model to estimate the geographic variation in the environ-
mental benefits from driving electric vehicles. The  second-best elec-
tric vehicle purchase subsidy ranges from $2,785 in California to 
−$4,964 in North Dakota, with a mean of −$1,095. Ninety percent 
of local environmental externalities from driving electric vehicles in 
one state are exported to others, implying they may be subsidized 
locally, even when the environmental benefits are negative overall. 
Geographically differentiated subsidies can reduce deadweight loss, 
but only modestly. (JEL D12, D62, H23, L62, Q53, Q54, R11)
For a variety of reasons, including technological advances, environmental con-
cerns, and entrepreneurial audacity, the market for pure electric vehicles, which was 
moribund for more than a century, is poised for a dramatic revival.1 Several mod-
els are already selling in considerable volumes, the portfolio of electric vehicles is 
beginning to span the vehicle choice set, and almost all major manufacturers are 
bringing new models to the market. The Federal Government is encouraging these 
developments by providing a significant subsidy for the purchase of an electric vehi-
cle, and some states augment the federal policy with their own additional subsidy.2
Proponents of these subsidies argue electric vehicles generate a range of 
 short-term and  long-term benefits such as reduced environmental impacts,  innovation 
1 http://energy.gov/articles/ history-electric-car (accessed October 17, 2016). 
2 Internal Revenue Code Section 30D (Notice  2009-89) provides a tax credit of up to $7,500. 
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spillovers, and reduced reliance on imported oil.3 In this paper we analyze whether 
electric vehicles do indeed generate  short-term environmental benefits by examining 
air pollution damages from driving gasoline vehicles and charging electric vehicles. 
In particular, we focus on the importance of local factors by including global and 
local pollution, spatial heterogeneity of damages, pollution export across political 
jurisdictions, and policy that may vary by location.
Three main considerations motivate our analysis. First, prior studies of electric 
vehicles have focused on calculating the emissions of electric vehicles but have not 
had a conceptual framework for analyzing electric vehicle subsidies.4 We analyze a 
model of vehicle choice, which gives us the theoretically sound and intuitive result 
that the subsidy should be equal to the difference in lifetime damages between an 
electric vehicle and a gasoline vehicle. Our theoretical framework also allows us to 
address additional policy questions regarding the best policies for different jurisdic-
tional levels and the welfare gains from policy differentiation.5
Second, despite being treated by regulators as “zero emission vehicles,” electric 
vehicles are not necessarily emissions free (see, for example, National Academy of 
Sciences 2010). In 2014, the US Department of Energy reported that nearly 70 per-
cent of electricity generated in the United States is produced by burning coal and 
natural gas. In many locations, the comparison between a gasoline vehicle and an 
electric one is really a comparison between burning gasoline or a mix of coal and 
natural gas to move the vehicle. However, average emissions of regional power 
plants can be a misleading indicator of the environmental impact of electric cars 
because all power plants do not respond proportionally to an increase in electricity 
usage and because electricity flows do not respect regional (e.g., state) boundaries.6 
To assess the emissions from charging an electric vehicle, we use an econometric 
model to estimate the effect of charging an electric vehicle on the marginal emis-
sions of multiple pollutants at each power plant.7
Third, there are significant physical differences between emissions from gasoline 
and electric vehicles. This is due to the distributed nature of the electricity grid, 
the height at which emissions occur, and the chemistry of fuel combustion. As a 
result, pollutants and emissions rates may be spatially distinct even if gasoline and 
electric vehicles are driven in the same place. For local pollutants, an additional 
problem is that the same vehicle driven in different places leads to different dam-
ages. For this reason, many prior studies consider only carbon dioxide.8 We use an 
integrated assessment model to value damages across local and global pollutants for 
both  electric and gasoline vehicles.9
3 http://energy.gov/eere/vehicles/ ev-everywhere-grand-challenge-does-10-year-vision-plug-electric-vehicles 
(accessed October 17, 2016). 
4 See, for example, Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Michalek et al. (2011). 
5 Examples of theoretical discrete choice transportation models include De Borger (2001); De Borger and 
Mayeres (2007); and Parry and Small (2005). Differentiated policy is analyzed by Weitzman (1974); Mendelsohn 
(1986); Banzhaf and Chupp (2012); and Fowlie and Muller (2013). 
6 The EPA’s calculated CO 2 emissions rates for electric vehicles (www.fueleconomy.gov) are regional averages. 
7 This builds on Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Holland and Mansur (2008). 
8 See, for example, Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Archsmith, Kendall, and Rapson (2015). 
9 Previous air pollution integrated assessment research includes Mendelsohn (1980); Burtraw et al. (1998); 
Mauzerall et al. (2005); Tong et al. (2006); Fann, Fulcher, and Hubbell (2009); Levy, Baxter, and Schwartz (2009); 
Muller and Mendelsohn (2009); and Henry, Muller, and Mendelsohn (2011). We model both  ground-level  emissions 
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Addressing these three considerations yields a powerful modeling framework for 
analyzing electric vehicle policy. In particular, our study is the first to consider the 
geographic variation in damages from both local and global pollutants emitted by 
both gasoline and electric vehicles and to tie this variation to a choice model.10 This 
framework enables us not only to evaluate the environmental benefit of electric cars, 
but also to address questions of political economy and fiscal federalism.
Our first set of results documents the considerable heterogeneity in the environ-
mental benefits of an electric vehicle relative to a gasoline vehicle. These bene-
fits can be large and positive, large and negative, or negligible, depending on the 
location. For example, California has relatively large damages from gasoline vehi-
cles and a relatively clean electric grid, which implies large positive environmental 
benefits of an electric vehicle. These conditions are reversed in North Dakota. The 
variation in the sign of the environmental benefits stems almost entirely from local 
air pollution. If we account only for greenhouse gases, then electric vehicles are 
superior to gasoline vehicles almost everywhere. Using our model, we determine 
the welfare maximizing subsidies on electric vehicle purchases. We refer to these 
subsidies as  second-best, but we stress that they only account for the relative dif-
ferences in environmental impacts from driving electric and gasoline vehicles in 
the short run. Even in locations like California, subsidy values are significantly less 
than the current federal subsidy. The national average subsidy for the purchase of an 
electric vehicle is estimated to be −$1,095. Thus, on average in the United States, 
the  second-best purchase policy is a tax, not a subsidy.
Our second set of results shows the remarkable degree to which electric vehicles 
driven in one location lead to environmental externalities in other locations. At the 
state level, 91 percent of local pollution damages from driving an electric vehicle are 
exported to states other than the state in which the vehicle is driven. In contrast, only 
19 percent of local pollution damages from driving a gasoline vehicle are exported to 
other states. This discrepancy casts doubt on the efficacy of policy selected by local 
regulators. It is not obvious whether a given state will consider full damages (dam-
ages across all states), or only native damages (those damages which actually occur 
in the given state) when setting policy. Moreover, state regulators face incentives in 
current air pollution policy that emphasize  within-state consequences of emissions. 
The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) emphasize compliance with 
ambient pollution limits within states. Although there are constraints on the extent 
of exported pollution, especially from power plants, the NAAQS clearly encourage 
local compliance. This leads state regulators to focus on  in-state damage and hence 
prefer a technology that exports pollution to other regions. The difference between 
using full and native damages in determining the  second-best subsidy may be consid-
erable. Accounting for full damages, the  second-best subsidy is positive in 11 states. 
Accounting for only native damages, the  second-best subsidy is positive in 32 states.
and power plant emissions throughout the contiguous United States. In contrast to prior work, we report damages 
within the county of emission, within the state of emission, and in total (across all receptors). 
10 Babaee, Nagpure, and DeCarolis (2014); Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014); Michalek et al. (2011); 
and Tessum, Hill, and Marshall (2014) analyze the benefits of electric vehicles at the aggregate level. Li et al. (forth-
coming) consider variation in damages from electric vehicles but assume uniform damages from gasoline vehicles. 
Grissom (2013) considers variation in damages from gasoline vehicles but does not account for local pollution 
from electric vehicle charging. Archsmith, Kendall, and Rapson (2015) assess the life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) 
benefits from electric vehicles. 
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The final set of results assesses the deadweight loss of various policies as well 
as the welfare gains from differentiated policy. Our theoretical analysis reveals that 
the welfare gains from differentiated subsidies depend on the higher order moments 
of the distribution of environmental benefits. Calibrating this model gives us an 
estimate of the magnitude of these gains. For electric vehicle subsidies, we find 
large deadweight loss and small welfare gains from differentiation. For taxes on 
gasoline miles, we find small (or zero) deadweight loss and larger welfare gains 
from differentiation.
There are several important caveats to our calculation of the environmental bene-
fits of electric vehicles. First, it only captures air pollution emissions associated with 
driving or charging the vehicles. It does not account for “upstream” environmental 
externalities associated with producing either fuels or vehicles. Second, it is based 
on the electricity grid in the years 2010–2012 and current gasoline vehicle technol-
ogy.11 Over time, both the grid and gasoline vehicles may become cleaner. Third, it 
depends on marginal emissions from an increase in the demand for electric power 
to charge electric vehicles. This may not be appropriate when electric vehicles com-
prise a substantial fraction of the vehicle fleet. Fourth, it ignores  preexisting envi-
ronmental polices such as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards 
and cap-and-trade markets for various local pollutants. For each of these caveats, 
we consider the degree to which they affect our calculated environmental benefits. 
For example, accounting for CAFE standards leads to an additional environmental 
cost of $1,555 per vehicle, whereas if there were a binding cap on  SO 2 the additional 
environmental benefit would be $2,280 per vehicle.
With these caveats in mind, our main results show that the subsidy for electric 
vehicles is not justified by environmental benefits. But, as noted above, there are 
other arguments in favor of electric vehicle subsidies. Perhaps most important is the 
possibility of the  long-term benefits due to a combination of innovation spillovers, 
learning by doing, and dynamic changes to the electricity grid. Any such  long-term 
benefits may be at least partially offset by the  short-term costs associated with cur-
rent electric vehicle use. Our analysis provides an estimate of these  short-term costs. 
Moreover, by shedding light on issues related to differentiated regulation and pol-
lution export, we provide a policy framework for subsequent analysis of  long-term 
issues.
In Section I we develop a simple general equilibrium model that includes dis-
crete choice over vehicle type as well as environmental externalities from driving. In 
Section II we describe the methods by which we determine emissions and damages 
from electric and gasoline vehicles. Section III presents the results. In Section IV we 
discuss the caveats to our analysis. Section V concludes.
I. Theoretical Model
Consider a theoretical discrete choice transportation model in which consumers 
in the market for a new vehicle choose between a gasoline vehicle and an electric 
11 The emissions inventory used by our integrated assessment model (AP2) is from 2011. These are the latest 
years for which all data are available. 
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vehicle.12 Consumers obtain utility from a composite consumption good  x (with 
price normalized to one) and from miles driven over the life of the selected vehicle, 
either gasoline miles  g or electric miles  e . We allow for several policy variables. The 
government may provide a subsidy  s for the purchase of an electric vehicle, place 
a tax  t g on gasoline miles, a tax  t e on electric miles, or some combination of these 
policies.13 We hold fuel and vehicle prices fixed.14
The indirect utility of purchasing a gasoline vehicle is
  V g =  max x, g x + f (g)  such that x + (  p g +  t g )g = I −  p Ψ , 
where  p Ψ is the price of the gasoline vehicle,  p g is the price of a gasoline mile,  I is 
income, and  f is a concave function. Likewise, the indirect utility of purchasing an 
electric vehicle is
  V e =  max x, e x + h (e)  such that x + (  p e +  t e )e = I − (  p Ω − s) , 
where  p Ω is the price of the electric vehicle,  p e is the price of an electric mile, and  h 
is a concave function. Any difference in attributes between the gasoline and electric 
vehicle are captured by differences in the functions  f and  g . Because the objective 
function in these optimization problems is  quasi-linear, there are no income effects.15
Following the discrete choice literature, we assume that the choice of vehicle is 
influenced by i.i.d. random variables  ϵ g and  ϵ e drawn from a common extreme value 
distribution with zero expected value and standard deviation that is proportional to 
a parameter  μ .16 Accordingly, we define
   g =  V g +  ϵ g , 
and
   e =  V e +  ϵ e . 
A consumer selects the gasoline vehicle if   g >   e . This occurs with probability
  π ≡ Probability(  g >   e ) =  
exp ( V g / μ)  ___________________ 
exp ( V g /μ )  + exp ( V e /μ)
. 
The expected utility of a new vehicle purchase is given by
  E [max[   e ,   g ]] = μ ln (exp ( V e /μ) + exp ( V g /μ)) . 
12 Examples of general discrete choice models are Anderson, Palma, and Thisse (1992) and Small and Rosen 
(1981). Applications to transportation models are De Borger (2001) and De Borger and Mayeres (2007). In online 
Appendix A, we extend the model to include several vehicles of each type. 
13 Alternatively, we might consider a tax on fuel consumption. These taxes are equivalent in our model, but may 
not be equivalent in a model with multiple vehicles of each type. See Fullerton and West (2002). 
14 This is consistent with a model in which vehicles and miles are produced by  price-taking firms using constant 
returns to scale technology. 
15 The marginal utility of income is equal to one, the number of miles driven does not depend on income, and 
the choice of vehicle does not depend on income. 
16 The variance is  μ 2  (3.14159 ) 2 / 6 . 
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Consumers create negative environmental externalities by driving, but ignore the 
damages from these externalities when making choices about the type of vehicle and 
number of miles. In our empirical analysis, gasoline vehicles emit several pollutants 
from their tailpipes and electric vehicles cause emissions of several pollutants from 
the smokestacks of electric power plants that charge them. Because the damages 
from these pollutants may be global or local, we introduce multiple locations into 
the model.
A. Uniform versus Differentiated Regulation
Let  m denote the number of locations and let  α i denote the proportion of the total 
population of new vehicle buyers that resides in location  i . An important feature of 
our model is that driving in one location may lead to local damages in that location, 
as well as local damages in other locations. Accordingly, we define full damages 
due to driving in location  i as the sum across all locations of local damages plus the 
global damages. Assuming that both global and local damage functions are linear 
allows us to characterize full damages with a single variable for each type of vehi-
cle.17 Let  δ gi denote the marginal full damages (in dollars per mile) from driving a 
gasoline vehicle in location  i , and  δ ei denote the marginal full damages (in dollars 
per mile) from driving an electric vehicle in location  i .
We determine welfare maximizing purchase subsidies under both uniform regu-
lation (the same policy applies to all locations) and differentiated regulation (policy 
may vary from location to location). Because the  first-best policy in our model is 
differentiated Pigouvian taxes on both types of miles, we refer to the welfare maxi-
mizing subsidies as  second-best.18
First we study differentiated regulation. Here there are  m local governments that 
select  location-specific purchase subsidies. Let  R i denote the expected government 
revenue generated by the purchase of a new vehicle in location  i .19 For the moment, 
we assume local government  i cares about full damages due to driving in location  i . 
It selects the purchase subsidy  s i to maximize the welfare   i associated with the 
purchase of a new vehicle within location  i , defined as the sum of expected utility 
and expected revenue less expected pollution damage:20
   i = μ (ln (exp ( V ei /μ) + exp ( V gi /μ))) +  R i − (  δ gi  π i  g i +  δ ei (1 −  π i )  e i ). 
Optimizing the welfare function gives the following proposition (all proofs are in 
online Appendix A).
17 Constant marginal damages is consistent with the EPA’s social cost of carbon calculations as well as prior 
research on local air pollution (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009; Fowlie and Muller 2013). 
18 Results for uniform taxes on miles are in online Appendix B. 
19 Alternatively we could have a single revenue equation and assume that a central government makes the 
 location-specific policy choices. But, given our subsequent distinction between full and native damages, it is natural 
to consider distinct local governments. 
20 Because there are no income effects, the consumer component of welfare is equivalent to the standard notion 
of compensating variation (Small and Rosen 1981). 
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PROPOSITION 1: The  second-best differentiated subsidy on the purchase of the 
electric vehicle in location  i is given by  s i ∗ where
  s i ∗ =  ( δ gi  g i −  δ ei  e i ) . 
The term  δ gi  g i −  δ ei  e i is simply the difference between the full damages over the 
driving lifetime of a gasoline vehicle and the full damages over the driving lifetime 
of an electric vehicle.21 Even if the electric vehicle emits less pollution per mile 
than the gasoline vehicle, the sign of the subsidy is ambiguous, because the num-
ber of miles driven may be different. If the miles driven are indeed the same, and 
the electric vehicle emits less pollution per mile than the gasoline vehicle, then the 
subsidy is positive. We refer to the difference  δ gi −  δ ei as the environmental benefits 
of an electric vehicle. This concept assumes that the number of miles driven by the 
two types of vehicles is the same (an assumption we will maintain in most of the 
empirical section below).
Next we study uniform regulation. Here a central government selects a uniform 
subsidy that applies to all  m locations. The government’s objective is to maximize 
 ∑  α i  W i , which is the weighted average of welfare across locations. The next propo-
sition delineates the  second-best uniform subsidy. It also describes an approximation 
formula for the welfare gain in moving from uniform regulation to differentiated 
regulation.
PROPOSITION 2: Assume that prices, income, and the functions  h and  g are the 
same across locations. The  second-best uniform subsidy on the purchase of an elec-
tric vehicle is given by  s ̃, where
  s ̃ =  ( ( ∑  α i  δ gi ) g −  ( ∑  α i  δ ei ) e) . 
Furthermore, let  ( S ∗ ) be the weighted average of welfare from using the 
 second-best differentiated subsidies  s i ∗ in each location and let  ( S ̃) be the weighted 
average of welfare from using the  second-best uniform subsidy  s ̃in each location. To 
a  second-order approximation, we have
 ( S ∗ ) − ( S ̃) ≈  1 __
2
π(1 − π ) 
(
 1 __μ  ∑  α i  ( s i ∗ −  s ̃) 2 −  1 ___  μ 2 (1 − 2π)  ∑  α i  ( s i 
∗ −  s ̃) 3 
)
 , 
where  π is evaluated at the uniform subsidy.
These results are most easily interpreted in the special case in which the popula-
tion of new vehicle buyers is the same in each location  ( α i =  1 _n) and the electric 
vehicle and gasoline vehicle are driven the same number of miles ( g = e ).22 Here 
the  second-best uniform subsidy  s ̃is equal to the average environmental benefits 
21 The formula for  s i ∗ has a simple structure because there are two vehicles in the choice set. If the choice set is 
larger, then  s i ∗ will depend on the various  cross-price elasticities (see online Appendix A). 
22 To test the robustness of the results in Propositions 1 and 2, we also analyze a model in which consumers 
make a continuous choice between gasoline and electric miles. See online Appendix C. 
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multiplied by the number of miles driven. And the approximate welfare gain from 
differentiation is a function of the second and third moments of the distribution of 
the environmental benefits. To understand these results, consider marginal welfare 
in region  i :
  
∂   i  ____∂  s i 
 =  π(1 − π) _______μ  (− s i + g ( δ gi −  δ ei ) ) .
When set equal to zero in a  first-order condition, the policy variable  s i can be solved 
for as a linear function of the environmental benefits. But the marginal welfare func-
tion itself is a  nonlinear function of  s i (through the variable  π ). If it had been linear 
in  s i , then the approximate welfare gain from differentiation would not have been a 
function of the third moment.23
Proposition 2 provides a point of comparison to previous work on differentiated 
regulation. But the practical application of the approximation is limited because it 
depends on the value of  μ . Recall that this parameter is proportional to the standard 
deviation of the random variables in the utility function. If we determine a value for 
μ , either by an econometric procedure (Dubin and McFadden 1984) or by a cali-
bration procedure (De Borger and Mayeres 2007), then we will generally be able to 
determine the exact numerical value of the welfare gain, which eliminates the need 
for an approximation.
B. Full versus Native Damages
So far we have assumed that local government  i is concerned with the full dam-
ages caused by driving in location  i . But this may not necessarily hold. For example, 
when an electric vehicle is driven in Pennsylvania, regulators in Pennsylvania may 
be more concerned about environmental damages which occur in Pennsylvania than 
they are about downwind damages that occur in New York. To account for this possi-
bility, it is useful to break up full damages into native damages (i.e., those damages 
which occur in location  i ) and exported damages (i.e., those which occur in other 
locations.)
If a local government only cares about native damages, then its objective is to 
maximize
   ̂ i = μ (ln (exp ( V ei /μ) + exp ( V gi /μ))) +  R i − ( δ ˆgi  π i  g i +  δ ˆei (1 −  π i ) e i ), 
where  δ ˆgi and  δ ˆei are the marginal native damages in location  i due to driving a vehi-
cle in location  i . It follows from Proposition 1 that the  second-best purchase subsidy 
based on native damages, denoted by  s ˆi ∗ , is given by
  s ˆi ∗ =  ( δ ˆgi  g i −  δ ˆei  e i ) . 
23 For more details and a comparison with Mendelsohn (1986), see online Appendix D. See also Jacobsen et al. 
(2016). 
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We would expect considerable heterogeneity across locations in the relationship 
between native and full damages due to the various chemical and physical processes 
that govern the flow of local pollution. In general, however, we would expect elec-
tric vehicles to export more pollution than gasoline vehicles, due to the distributed 
nature of electricity generation as well as the fact that smokestacks release emis-
sions much higher in the atmosphere than tailpipes. The greater the extent to which 
the electric emissions are exported to other locations, the greater the extent to which 
a given location may want to subsidize the purchase of an electric vehicle.
II. Calculating Air Pollution Damages
The theoretical model illustrates that the environmental benefits of an electric 
vehicle arises from reduced damages relative to the gasoline vehicle it replaces. We 
calculate this benefit by determining emissions per mile for electric and gasoline 
vehicles, and then mapping emissions into damages, accounting for the fact that 
both emissions and damages may differ by location. In these calculations, we use 
the county as the basic unit of location. We first give an overview of our general 
procedure, and then describe the details of our two component empirical models.
We consider damages from five pollutants: CO2, SO2, NOx, PM2.5, and VOCs. 
These pollutants account for the majority of global and local air pollution damages 
and have been a major focus of public policy.24 Our set of electric vehicles includes 
each of the 11 pure electric vehicles in the EPA fuel efficiency database for the 2014 
model year.25 Our set of gasoline vehicles is meant to capture the closest substitute 
in terms of  non-price attributes to each electric vehicle. Wherever possible, we use 
the  gasoline-powered version of the identical vehicle, e.g., the  gasoline-powered 
Ford Focus for the electric Ford Focus.26
To determine the emissions per mile for each gasoline vehicle, we integrate data 
from several sources.27 For CO2 and SO2, emissions are directly proportional to 
gasoline usage, so we use conversion factors in the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated 
Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) model scaled.28 We differ-
entiate urban and  nonurban counties by using the EPA’s city and highway mileage.29 
For NOx emissions, we use the Tier 2 emission standards for the vehicle “bin.” For 
PM2.5 and VOCs, we combine the Tier 2 standards with GREET estimates of PM2.5 
emissions from tires and brakes and VOC emissions from evaporation. The implica-
tion of this procedure is that emissions per mile for each gasoline vehicle only differ 
across urban and  nonurban counties.30
24 We do not analyze emissions of CO and toxics like mercury. Most CO emissions are from vehicles, and most 
toxics are from power plants, so the direction of bias from these omissions is unclear. 
25 The federal purchase subsidy depends on the size of the battery. All 11 pure electric vehicles are eligible for 
the maximum subsidy of $7,500. 
26 Survey data on new vehicle purchases provided by MaritzCX was used to verify that these choices were 
reasonable. See online Appendix E for details. 
27 We do not make  state-level adjustments to car emissions, although fuel blend regulations in California have 
been shown to improve air quality (Auffhammer and Kellogg 2011). 
28 In the 2012 GREET model, developed by Argonne National Laboratory, the SO2 emissions rate is 
0.00616 g/mile at 23.4 mpg. This is slightly higher than the Tier 2 allowed 30 ppm which would be 
0.00485 g/mile at 23.4 mpg. 
29 Urban counties are defined as counties which are part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
30 The emissions per mile for our gasoline vehicles are reported in Table A in online Appendix E. 
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For electric vehicles, determining emissions per mile is more complicated. We 
begin with the EPA estimate of mpg equivalent (i.e., the estimated kWh per mile).31 
We adjust this figure to account for the temperature profile of each county, because 
electric vehicles use more electricity per mile in cold and hot weather.32 Next we 
use an econometric model (described below) to estimate the marginal emissions 
factors (e.g., tons per kWh) for each of our pollutants at each of 1,486 power plants 
due to an increase in regional electricity load. We combine these estimates with an 
assumed daily charging profile to determine the emissions per mile at each power 
plant due to the charging of an electric vehicle in a given county.33 The implication 
of this procedure is that emissions per mile for each electric vehicle may differ 
across any two counties.
Next we map emissions into damages. For CO2, we use the EPA social cost of 
carbon of $41 per ton.34 For local pollutants, we use the AP2 model. This model 
calculates damages per unit of a given local pollutant in each county (as described 
below). By multiplying emissions per mile and damages per unit emitted, and then 
aggregating across pollutants (and, for electric vehicles, across power plants) we 
obtain the full damages per mile for each gasoline vehicle and each electric vehicle 
in each county. As in the theoretical section, these full damages account for global 
effects, local effects in the given county, and local effects in other counties.
To analyze any policy which affects multiple counties, we need a sense of the rel-
ative importance of driving in the counties. We weight all summary statistics using 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in each county, as estimated by the EPA for their 
Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES).35
A. Econometric Model: Estimation of Marginal Emission Factors 
 from Electricity Use
To determine the emissions that result from electricity use to charge an electric 
vehicle, we must determine which power plants respond (and how they respond) to 
increases in electricity usage at different locations. The electricity grid in the con-
tiguous United States consists of three main “interconnections”: Eastern, Western, 
and Texas. Since there are substantial electricity flows within each interconnection 
but quite limited flows between interconnections, we model each interconnection 
separately. Within each interconnection, transmission constraints prevent the free 
flow of electricity throughout the interconnection. Accordingly, we follow the North 
31 We use the combined city/highway EPA figure and do not differentiate electric vehicles by urban and rural 
since regenerative braking leads to smaller differences in city and highway efficiencies. 
32 This is due to both the decreased performance of the battery and the increased demand for climate control 
(Yuksel and Michalek 2015). Temperature has a smaller effect on the performance of gasoline vehicles, so we do 
not adjust gasoline mpg for temperature. We model the electric vehicle range loss as a Gaussian distribution with 
no range loss at 68ºF but a 33 percent range loss at 19.4ºF. See online Appendix G. We explore how sensitive our 
findings are to this assumption, as well as others, in Section IIID. 
33 We analyze eight charging profiles: our baseline profile using estimates from Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) (see Figure B in online Appendix F), a flat profile, and six profiles with  nonoverlapping  four-hour 
charging blocks. 
34 See “The Social Cost of Carbon,” EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon. We use the 
year 2015, 3 percent discount rate estimate and convert it to 2014 dollars. Moreover, all monetary values in all 
model components are also converted to 2014 dollars. 
35 If vehicle life and miles driven per year per vehicle are the same across counties, then these weights are equiv-
alent to the weights  α i (the number of new vehicle buyers) used in the theoretical model. 
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American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and divide the three intercon-
nections into nine distinct regions.36 We use these nine NERC regions to define the 
spatial scale for measuring emissions per kWh. In particular, our estimation strategy 
assumes that an electric vehicle charged at any county within a given NERC region 
has the same marginal emission factors as an electric vehicle charged at any other 
county within the same region.37
Our data consists of hourly emissions of CO2, SO2, NOx, and PM2.5 at 
1,486 power plants as well as hourly electricity consumption (i.e., electricity load) 
for each of our nine NERC regions, for the years 2010–2012.38 We use these data 
to estimate the effect of electricity load on emissions, employing methods simi-
lar to Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Holland and Mansur (2008). 
Like them, we allow for an integrated market where electricity consumed within an 
interconnection may be provided by any power plant within that interconnection. In 
contrast, however, we estimate the effect of changes in electricity load separately for 
each power plant in the interconnection.
The dependent variable in our analysis,  y it , is power plant  i ’s hourly emissions 
(CO2 , SO2 , NOx, or PM2.5) at time  t . For each power plant, we regress the dependent 
variable on the contemporaneous electricity load in each of the regions within the 
power plant’s interconnection. To account for different charging profiles, the coeffi-
cients on load vary by hour of the day. The regression includes fixed effects for each 
hour of the day interacted with the month of the sample. We regress
  y it =  ∑ 
h=1
24
   ∑ 
j=1
J(i)
  β ijh HOU R h LOA D jt +  ∑ 
h=1
24




  α ihm HOU R h MONT H m +  ε it , 
where  J(i ) equals the number of regions in the interconnection in which power plant 
i is located,  HOU R h is an indicator variable for hour of the day  h ,  MONT H m indicates 
month of the sample  m , and  LOA D jt is the electricity consumed in region  j at time  t . 
The coefficients of interest are the marginal emission factors  β ijh , which represent 
the change in emissions at plant  i from an increase in electricity usage in region  j in 
hour of the day  h .
B. The AP2 Model: Determining Damages from Local Air Pollution
The AP2 model is an integrated assessment air pollution model.39 AP2 con-
nects reported emissions (USEPA 2014) to estimates of ambient concentrations 
using an air quality model. In particular, the air quality model maps emissions of 
ammonia, NOx , SO2, PM2.5, and VOCs from each reported source of air pollu-
tion in the contiguous United States into ambient concentrations of SO2, O3, and 
PM2.5 at all receptor locations (i.e., the 3,110 counties in the contiguous United 
36 See online Appendix H for our procedure for assigning counties to NERC regions. 
37 There are some data on electricity load at NERC  subregions. Due to a high degree of  multi-collinearity, our 
estimation strategy would likely not work at this level of disaggregation. 
38 CO2, SO2, and NOx data are directly from the EPA continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS). We 
construct hourly PM2.5 from hourly generation and annual PM2.5 emissions rates. Power plant emissions of VOCs 
are negligible. More details about this data are in online Appendix I. 
39 See Muller (2011). More details of our implementation of AP2 are given in online Appendix I. 
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States). The remaining components of AP2 then link these ambient concentra-
tions to exposures, physical effects, and monetary damages. Welfare endpoints 
covered by the model include: human health, crop and timber yields, degrada-
tion of  buildings and material, and reduced visibility and recreation (Muller and 
Mendelsohn 2007). Human exposures are calculated using  county-level popula-
tion data for 2011 which are reported by the US Census. Crop and timber yields 
are reported by the US Department of Agriculture. Damages associated with built 
structures, visibility, and recreation contribute a very small share of total damage 
(Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus 2011).
Exposures are translated into physical effects (e.g., premature deaths, cases 
of illness, lost crop yields) using  concentration-response functions reported in 
the related literature. In terms of the share of total damages, the most import-
ant  concentration-response functions are those governing adult mortality. We use 
results from Pope et al. (2002) to specify the effect of PM2.5 exposure on adult 
mortality rates and we use results from Bell et al. (2004) to specify the effect of 
O3 exposure on  all-age mortality rates.
40 Mortality risks, which comprise the vast 
majority of damage from local air pollution, are then expressed in terms of mone-
tary terms using an $8.1 million value of a statistical life (VSL). Crop and timber 
yield effects from pollution exposure are valued using 2011 market prices.
Because of the focus of this paper on small changes to the vehicle fleet, calcu-
lation of incremental damages  per-unit mass emitted is necessary. The algorithm 
used to compute damages per ton herein has been used in prior research (Muller 
and Mendelsohn 2009; Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus 2011). Briefly, this 
entails the following steps. With all sources in the United States emitting at their 
reported level in 2011, exposures, physical effects, and monetary damages are 
computed. Then, for an emission from a particular power plant, AP2 adds one ton 
of SO2 , for example, to reported emissions for 2011. Exposures, physical effects, 
and monetary damage are  re-computed. The incremental damages  per-unit mass 
is tabulated as the difference in monetary damage between the baseline case and 
the  add-one-ton case.
Importantly, in computing  per-unit emitted damages, AP2 aggregates the dif-
ference in damages across all county receptors affected by the additional ton. As 
discussed above, local governments may be more concerned about native damages 
rather than full damages. We use the AP2 model in a novel way to determine both 
types of damages. To determine full damages, we follow the usual procedure and 
aggregate damages at all receptors. To determine native damages, we only con-
sider damages that occur at receptors within the state or county of interest. For 
example, driving a gasoline vehicle in Fulton County, Georgia, creates a plume 
of pollution concentrated in a few counties. Gasoline native damages for Fulton 
County correspond to the portion of the plume that harms Fulton County. Driving 
an electric car in Fulton County leads to an increase in emissions from various 
power plants, as specified by the econometric model. The resulting plumes of 
pollution cover a number of counties. Electric native damages for Fulton County 
correspond to the portions of the plumes that harm Fulton County.
40 In our sensitivity analysis, we study a more recent concentration response function (Roman et al. 2008). 
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III. Results
A. Environmental Benefits of Electric Vehicles
The environmental benefits of electric vehicles depend on the difference between 
damages from gasoline and electric vehicles. We begin with damages from electric 
vehicles. The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates our baseline estimates of the dam-
ages (in cents per mile) for the 2014 electric Ford Focus by county.41 The variation 























Figure 1. Marginal Damages for Gas and Electric Vehicles by County
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is largely driven by the NERC regions, although damages do vary within a region 
due to our  county-specific temperature correction.
Table 1 summarizes the data in Figure 1 and shows sensitivity with respect to 
charging profiles.42 In the baseline EPRI profile, mean damages are 2.6 cents per 
mile (the equivalent of 8.1 cents per kWh) but range from $0.01 or less per mile in 
California and the West (WECC) to over $0.04 per mile in the Midwest (MISO and 
MRO). These regional differences in emissions reflect the pollution intensity of the 
fuels used in each region’s generating capacity as well as its electricity imports from 
other regions. There is some variation in damages across the charging profiles. Our 
baseline results are based on the EPRI charging profile, in which most electric vehi-
cle charging occurs at night. However, damages could be reduced in the Midwest 
(MISO and MRO) by over 1.5 cents per mile by charging between 1 pm and 4 pm, 
for example. But generally, variation across charging profiles is much smaller than 
the variation across NERC regions.
The left columns of panel A in Table 2 summarize the distribution of damages 
across counties for the electric Ford Focus as well as all other 2014 model year 
electric vehicles. For the electric Ford Focus, the mean is 2.59 cents per mile with 
a range from under $0.01 (in the West) to almost $0.05 (in the Midwest). The dif-
ference across vehicles is due solely to differences in their efficiency (in kWh per 
mile). For example, the BYD e6 (the dirtiest electric vehicle) uses approximately 
twice as many kWh per mile as the Chevy Spark (the cleanest electric vehicle). 
Correspondingly, the mean, minimum, and maximum damages of the BYD e6 are 
approximately double those of the Chevy Spark.
We now turn to the damages from gasoline vehicles. The top panel of Figure 1 
illustrates the damages (in cents per mile) for the gasoline Ford Focus by county. 
42 All results are in 2014$ and all summary statistics are weighted by VMT. 
Table 1—Mean Damages in Cents per Mile by Electricity Demand Region for a 2014 Ford Focus 
Electric Vehicle for Different Charging Profiles
Hr Hr Hr Hr Hr Hr VMT
Region EPRI Flat 1–4 5–8 9–12 13–16 17–20 21–24 (%)
California 0.69 0.75 0.65 0.78 0.78 0.84 0.82 0.64 11
WECC w/o CA 1.03 0.92 1.18 0.98 0.84 0.76 0.73 0.99 11
ERCOT 1.28 1.21 1.50 1.41 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.16 7
SPP 2.24 2.74 2.07 4.91 2.30 2.89 2.39 1.89 4
FRCC 2.48 2.14 3.21 2.36 2.25 1.39 1.53 2.11 6
SERC 2.75 2.67 2.75 2.26 2.72 2.96 2.63 2.71 22
NPCC 3.11 2.75 4.19 3.75 1.61 2.12 2.49 2.35 9
RFC 3.64 3.55 3.42 3.38 3.83 3.06 3.43 4.15 17
MISO & MRO 4.29 3.52 5.63 3.91 3.03 2.57 2.32 3.69 14
 
Total 2.59 2.41 2.90 2.56 2.28 2.15 2.12 2.46 100
Notes: The regions are ordered by the damage per mile under the EPRI charging profile. The EPRI charging pro-
file is illustrated in Figure B in online Appendix F; the flat charging profile assumes charging is equally likely 
across hours; and other profiles assume charging occurs only in the indicated hours. Damages (in cents per mile) 
are weighted across counties by passenger vehicle VMT. California is the California ISO; WECC w/o CA is the 
Western United States excluding California; ERCOT is Texas; SPP is Kansas and Oklahoma; FRCC is Florida; 
SERC is the Southeast; NPCC is the Northeast; RFC is the Mid-Atlantic and Midwest; and MISO & MRO is the 
upper Midwest. See Figure C in online Appendix H for a map of the regions. 
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The counties with large damages correspond to major population centers because 
air pollution damages are mostly comprised of premature mortality risks. These 
damages are summarized in the middle columns of panel A in Table 2. For the gaso-
line Ford Focus, mean damages are 1.86 cents per mile (the equivalent of $0.51 per 
gallon) but range from about $0.01 per mile to over $0.04 per mile.43
Notice that there is substantial overlap in the distributions of damages from 
gasoline and electric vehicles. If these damages were highly correlated, then the 
environmental benefits of an electric vehicle would be small in most counties. In 
fact, the damages are not highly correlated (the correlation is 0.07). As a result, the 
environmental benefits vary substantially, as shown in the right columns of panel A 
in Table 2. For example, gasoline vehicle damages are large in Los Angeles (due 
to the large population and properties of the airshed) but electric vehicle damages 
are small (due to the clean Western power grid). In this situation, the environmen-
tal benefits are almost equal to gasoline damages (i.e., $0.03 to $0.04 per mile) 
and hence electric vehicles have substantial environmental benefits. The opposite 
occurs in the upper Midwest where gasoline vehicle damages are small (due to low 
43 Mean damages per gallon of gasoline range from $0.48 to $0.62 across the vehicles. For the Ford Focus, 
damages across counties range from $0.37 to $1.12 per gallon. 
Table 2—Summary Statistics of Damages and Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile for 2014 
Electric Vehicles and Substitute 2014 Gasoline Vehicles across Counties
Electric vehicle Gasoline vehicle Environmental benefits
Vehicle Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Panel A. Damages and environmental benefits
Chevy Spark 2.28 0.59 4.17 1.69 0.95 4.30 −0.60 −3.15 3.08
Honda Fit 2.30 0.60 4.20 1.93 1.13 4.83 −0.37 −3.00 3.60
Fiat 500e 2.34 0.61 4.27 1.74 0.93 4.62 −0.60 −3.26 3.33
Nissan Leaf 2.38 0.62 4.35 1.23 0.74 3.53 −1.16 −3.52 2.22
Mitsubishi i-Miev 2.42 0.63 4.41 1.69 0.95 4.30 −0.73 −3.40 3.05
Smart fortwo 2.54 0.66 4.63 1.67 0.98 4.50 −0.87 −3.57 3.13
Ford Focus 2.59 0.67 4.72 1.86 1.03 4.32 −0.73 −3.63 3.16
Tesla S (60 kWh) 2.82 0.73 5.15 2.44 1.28 5.48 −0.38 −3.78 4.28
Tesla S (85 kWh) 3.06 0.80 5.59 2.67 1.48 5.74 −0.39 −4.02 4.55
Toyota Rav4 3.58 0.93 6.52 2.09 1.20 5.02 −1.49 −5.23 3.50







Vehicle Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Panel B. Decomposition of environmental benefits into global and local environmental benefits
Chevy Spark −0.60 −3.15 3.08 0.35 −0.14 0.72 −0.95 −3.01 2.37
Honda Fit −0.37 −3.00 3.60 0.52 0.02 0.89 −0.89 −3.02 2.71
Fiat 500e −0.60 −3.26 3.33 0.32 −0.19 0.71 −0.92 −3.08 2.63
Nissan Leaf −1.16 −3.52 2.22 −0.09 −0.40 0.28 −1.07 −3.16 1.99
Mitsubishi i-Miev −0.73 −3.40 3.05 0.30 −0.21 0.69 −1.04 −3.20 2.36
Smart fortwo −0.87 −3.57 3.13 0.18 −0.24 0.57 −1.06 −3.34 2.57
Ford Focus −0.73 −3.63 3.16 0.44 −0.21 0.89 −1.17 −3.43 2.28
Tesla S (60 kWh) −0.38 −3.78 4.28 0.83 -0.07 1.36 −1.21 −3.72 2.93
Tesla S (85 kWh) −0.39 −4.02 4.55 0.96 0.01 1.54 −1.36 −4.04 3.02
Toyota Rav4 −1.49 −5.23 3.50 0.23 −0.51 0.81 −1.72 −4.73 2.71
BYD e6 −2.27 −6.64 3.30 −0.04 −0.88 0.65 −2.23 −5.78 2.66
Notes: Damages are from power plant emissions or tailpipe emissions of NOx, VOCs, PM2.5, SO2, and CO2. Electric 
vehicles assume the EPRI charging profile. Substitute vehicles are defined as the identical make where possible. 
The substitute vehicle for the Nissan Leaf is the Toyota Prius; for the Mitsubishi i-Miev is the Chevy Spark; for the 
Tesla Model S is the BMW 740 or 750; and for the BYD e6 is the Toyota Rav4. Damages are in cents per mile and 
are weighted across counties by VMT. 
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 population densities) but electric vehicle damages are large (due to the prevalence of 
 coal-fired generation in the region and the temperature adjustment to electric vehicle 
range). Here the environmental benefits of an electric vehicle are negative, and are 
almost equal to the electric vehicle damages. Overall, the environmental benefits 
are negative on average for each of the electric vehicles in Table 2, panel A.44 The 
electric Ford Focus is the median electric vehicle in terms of environmental benefits, 
and we focus on it throughout the results section.
Panel B in Table 2 decomposes the environmental benefits into global benefits 
and local benefits. Just about every electric vehicle, in just about every place, cre-
ates global environmental benefits relative to gasoline vehicles. In contrast, the local 
environmental benefits from electric vehicles can be positive or negative depending 
on the place. But on average, for all electric vehicles, the negative local environmen-
tal benefits outweighs the positive global environmental benefits. Focusing solely on 
global environmental benefits provides a misleading impression of the environmen-
tal consequences of electric vehicles.45
Using Proposition 2, we can convert the environmental benefits into the 
 second-best purchase subsidy by assuming that both the electric vehicle and the gas-
oline vehicle are driven 150,000 miles.46 Figure 2 shows the  second-best subsidies 
by county. Except for a few counties around New York City and Atlanta, the subsidy 
is negative throughout the eastern part of the country (i.e., it is a tax on the purchase 
44 This is due in large part to the fact that only 30 percent of the VMT occurs in the three regions with the lowest 
marginal damages from electricity (see the last column of Table 1). 
45 Several prominent online sites that compare gasoline and electric vehicles (EPA, Union of Concerned 
Scientists) only consider global environmental benefits. 
46 We assume both vehicles have ten year lifetimes, regardless of the number of miles driven, and that both are 
driven 15,000 miles a year in the absence of any taxes on miles. In practice, vehicle life depends on both years and 
miles driven. Moreover, it is not clear whether electric vehicles will be driven more (due to lower costs per mile) or 
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Figure 2. Second-Best Electric Vehicle Subsidy by County
3716 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW dECEMbER 2016
of electric vehicles). The subsidy is large and negative in the upper Midwest. On the 
other hand, it is positive in most places in the West, and quite large in many counties 
in California. Overall, the  second-best subsidy ranges from about positive $5,000 to 
negative $5,000.
In Table 3, we aggregate to the level of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
The MSAs with the highest environmental benefits are all in California because 
electricity generation in the West does not produce much air pollution. In these 
MSAs, the environmental benefits are about $0.02 to $0.03 per mile (a  second-best 
subsidy of up to $5,000). The MSAs with the lowest environmental benefits are all 
in the upper Midwest, again because of the prevalence of  coal-fired power stations. 
Here the environmental benefits are −$0.03 per mile (a  second-best purchase tax of 
about $4,000). Other large MSAs can have either positive or negative environmental 
benefits. New York and Chicago have some of the largest damages from gasoline 
vehicles, but environmental benefits from electric vehicles are small or negative 
due to the large damages from electric vehicles. Electric vehicles have substan-
tial environmental benefits in the major Texas MSAs, due to relatively low electric 
Table 3—Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile by Metropolitan Statistical Areas for a 2014 
Ford Focus (Electric versus Gasoline)
Environmental Damage Damage
benefits per VMT per mile per mile Purchase
Metropolitan statistical area mile (percent) (gasoline) (electric) subsidy
Highest benefit MSAs
Los Angeles, CA 3.16 2.69 3.85 0.69 $4,743
Oakland, CA 2.21 0.75 2.89 0.68 $3,315
San Jose, CA 2.11 0.54 2.80 0.69 $3,166
San Francisco, CA 1.91 0.45 2.59 0.68 $2,867
Santa Ana, CA 1.87 0.93 2.54 0.67 $2,800
Other high VMT MSAs
San Diego, CA 1.85 0.97 2.53 0.68 $2,770
Riverside, CA 1.17 1.35 1.88 0.71 $1,756
Phoenix, AZ 0.74 1.16 1.77 1.03 $1,112
Houston, TX 0.67 1.74 2.01 1.35 $1,003
Dallas, TX 0.62 1.52 1.91 1.29 $926
New York, NY −0.02 1.97 3.16 3.18 −$32
Atlanta, GA −0.36 1.92 2.38 2.73 −$535
Chicago, IL −0.74 1.75 2.98 3.72 −$1,116
Washington, DC-VA −0.89 1.40 2.19 3.08 −$1,335
Minneapolis, MN −2.39 1.06 2.08 4.46 −$3,578
US and nonurban
US average −0.73 100 1.86 2.59 −$1,095
Nonurban −1.67 20 1.20 2.87 −$2,500
Lowest benefit MSAs
St. Cloud, MN −2.87 0.08 1.62 4.49 −$4,310
Bismarck, ND −2.97 0.04 1.52 4.49 −$4,456
Fargo, ND-MN −3.07 0.07 1.54 4.61 −$4,605
Duluth, MN-WI −3.09 0.10 1.47 4.56 −$4,635
Grand Forks, ND-MN −3.14 0.03 1.52 4.66 −$4,711
Notes: The environmental benefits are the difference in damages between the gasoline-powered Ford Focus and the 
electric Ford Focus. Environmental benefits are weighted by VMT by county within each MSA. Nonurban includes 
all counties that are not part of an MSA. The purchase subsidy assumes vehicle is driven 150,000 miles.
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 vehicle  damages in Texas. However, for  nonurban regions as well as for MSAs in the 
Southeast, Northeast, and Midwest, the benefits from electric vehicles are negative.
Table 4 contains a similar analysis at the state level. Compared to MSAs, the envi-
ronmental benefits of electric vehicles are smaller at the state level because of nega-
tive benefits in  nonurban areas. The largest environmental benefits are in California 
(a  second-best subsidy of $3,000) and other Western states. The lowest benefits are 
in the upper Midwest (a  second-best tax of almost $5,000 in North Dakota). There 
are only 11 states in which the environmental benefits are positive, and Texas is the 
only high VMT state outside the Western interconnection in which the environmen-
tal benefits are positive. The top panel of Figure 3 shows the  second-best purchase 
subsidy by state. When driven in the average state, a 2014 electric Ford Focus causes 
$1,095 more environmental damages over its driving lifetime than the equivalent 
gasoline Ford Focus.47
47 Although our main focus is on variation from this average, and the main focus in Michalek et al. (2011) is on 
 life-cycle costs, we can compare our results to theirs. They find, on average, a battery electric vehicle causes $181 
more environmental damages over its driving lifetime than a gasoline vehicle. See online Appendix O for details. 
Table 4—Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile by State for a 2014 Ford Focus 
(Electric versus Gasoline)
Environmental Damage Damage
benefits per VMT per mile per mile Purchase
State mile (percent) (gasoline) (electric) subsidy
Highest benefit states
California 1.86 11 2.55 0.69 $2,785
Utah 0.73 1 1.77 1.04 $1,089
Colorado 0.60 2 1.63 1.03 $902
Arizona 0.59 2 1.62 1.02 $889
Washington 0.58 2 1.59 1.02 $865
Other high VMT states
Texas 0.34 8 1.75 1.41 $505
Florida −0.70 7 1.80 2.49 −$1,049
Georgia −0.78 4 1.96 2.74 −$1,166
New York −0.91 5 2.19 3.10 −$1,371
North Carolina −1.07 4 1.67 2.74 −$1,611
Virginia −1.20 3 1.72 2.93 −$1,807
Illinois −1.56 3 2.31 3.87 −$2,345
Ohio −1.76 4 1.89 3.65 −$2,640
Pennsylvania −1.78 3 1.86 3.64 −$2,675
Michigan −2.48 3 1.76 4.24 −$3,720
Lowest benefit states
South Dakota −2.66 0 1.27 3.93 −$3,992
Minnesota −2.76 2 1.72 4.48 −$4,145
Wisconsin −2.79 2 1.59 4.37 −$4,180
Iowa −2.93 1 1.37 4.30 −$4,394
North Dakota −3.31 0 1.27 4.58 −$4,964
US average −0.73 100 1.86 2.59 −$1,095
Notes: The environmental benefits are the difference in damages between the gasoline-powered Ford Focus and the 
electric Ford Focus. Environmental benefits are weighted by gasoline-vehicle VMT within each state. The purchase 
subsidy assumes the vehicle is driven 150,000 miles. 
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B. Exporting Pollution: Full and Native Damages
Although both gasoline and electric vehicles export pollution, electric vehicles 
export pollution to a remarkable degree (the grid itself is distributed and emissions 
from power plants are released from tall smokestacks intended to disperse pollut-
ants over a wide area).48 To illustrate this discrepancy, we first analyze transport 
of a specific pollutant from a specific county. The top panel in Figure 4 illustrates 
the change in PM2.5 associated with driving  gasoline-powered Ford Focus vehicles 























Figure 3. Second-Best Electric Vehicle Subsidy by State (Full and Native Damages)
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in Fulton County, Georgia. Most of the increase in PM2.5 is centered within a few 
nearby counties. The bottom panel in Figure 4 shows the change in PM2.5 associated 
with equivalent driving by electric powered Ford Focus vehicles charged in the same 
county. The spatial footprint of PM 2.5 in this case encompasses the entire eastern 
United States.49

















Figure 4. Change in PM2.5 from Gasoline versus Electric Vehicle in Fulton County, Georgia
Notes: The top panel illustrates the change in PM2.5 associated with a fleet of 10,000 gasoline-powdered Ford Focus 
vehicles, each driven 15,000 miles in a year in Fulton County. The bottom panel illustrates the change in PM2.5 asso-
ciated with the same number of miles driven by electric powered Ford Focus vehicles charged in Fulton County, 
thereby increasing the consumption of electricity in the United States (SERC).
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Our definition of native damages allows a more comprehensive analysis of pollu-
tion export. Table 5 shows native damages at both the state and county levels for both 
electric and gasoline vehicles. For electric vehicles, full damages from local pollut-
ants are 1.7 cents per mile on average. Native state damages are only 0.15 cents per 
mile, and native county damages are only 0.02 cents per mile. Thus on average 91 
percent of electric vehicle damages from local pollutants are exported from the state 
and 99 percent are exported from the county. Local damages from gasoline vehicles 
are exported to a much smaller extent. On average only 19 percent of these damages 
are exported from a state and only 57 percent are exported from a county.
Using native damages rather than full damages changes the environmental bene-
fits calculation quite dramatically, especially at the lower tail of the distribution. In 
this lower tail, gasoline full damages are small and electric full damages are large. 
Because most electric vehicle damages are exported, both native gasoline damages 
and native electric damages are small. This implies that the lower tail of environ-
mental benefits moves from approximately −3.6 cents per mile to approximately 
−0.06 cents per mile for  county-level native damages. In contrast, at the upper tail 
of the distribution, electric vehicle damages were already low, so accounting for 
native damages has a smaller impact on the environmental benefits. On average, the 
environmental benefits calculated using native damages is positive at both the state 
and county level. Correspondingly, as illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 3, the 
state level  second-best purchase subsidy, using native damages, is positive in 32 out 
of 48 states.
Table 5—Native Damages in Cents per Mile by State and County and Export Percentages
Vehicle Damages Mean Med. SD Min Max
Electric All 2.59 2.74 1.18 0.67 4.72
Non-GHG 1.70 1.86 1.02 0.16 3.50
State 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.33
 Export percent 91 91 91
County 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06
 Export percent 99 99 98
Gasoline All 1.86 1.76 0.59 1.03 4.32
Non-GHG 0.53 0.36 0.52 0.01 2.92
State 0.43 0.26 0.51 0.00 2.76
 Export percent 19 28 5
County 0.23 0.10 0.37 0.00 2.03
 Export percent 57 72 30
Environmental benefits All −0.73 −1.01 1.39 −3.63 3.16
Non-GHG −1.17 −1.48 1.19 −3.43 2.28
State 0.28 0.12 0.51 −0.32 2.46
County 0.21 0.08 0.37 −0.06 2.00
Notes: Damages in cents per mile. All reports damages from all pollutants at all receptors. Non-GHG reports dam-
ages from local pollutants (i.e., excluding CO2) at all receptors. State reports damages from local pollutants from 
receptors within the same state as the source. County reports damages from local pollutants from receptors within 
the same county as the source. State Export percent reports the share of non-GHG damages which occur at receptors 
outside the state. County Export percent reports the share of non-GHG damages which occur at receptors outside 
the county. Electric damages assume the EPRI charging profile. Damages are weighted by VMT. 
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Do state policymakers place greater emphasis on full or native damages when 
considering electric vehicle subsidies? A number of states have implemented sub-
sidies for the adoption of electric vehicles, above and beyond the federal subsidy, 
such as California ($2,500), Colorado ($6,000), Georgia ($5,000), Illinois ($4,000), 
and Maryland ($3,000). In addition, some states offer a variety of other incentives, 
including carpool lane access, electricity discounts, and parking benefits.50 As 
shown in online Appendix J, both actual subsidies and the number of other incen-
tives are more highly correlated with our calculated native damage subsidy than 
with our calculated full damage subsidy. This evidence suggests that native damages 
may help explain state policymakers’ support for electric vehicle subsidies.
C. State and County Differentiated Policies
Our analysis shows that the environmental benefits of electric vehicles vary sub-
stantially across locations. This raises the question of whether differentiated policies 
can lead to large enough welfare gains to offset any additional implementation costs. 
To illustrate these welfare gains, we calibrate the discrete choice model developed 
in Section II.51 In addition to electric vehicle purchase subsidies, we also consider 
 fuel-specific taxes on miles driven (i.e., VMT taxes), because such taxes at the 
county level correspond to  first-best policy in our model. Some care must be taken 
with the interpretation of these results, because they rely on a number of assump-
tions and specific functional forms. Nevertheless, they illustrate the complexity of 
comparing the gains from differentiation across different policies.
Panel A in Table 6 shows the deadweight losses for differentiated VMT tax pol-
icies.  County-specific taxes on electric miles and gasoline miles set at the Pigovian 
levels  t ei =  δ ei and  t gi =  δ gi have zero deadweight loss. To calculate deadweight 
losses of other policies, we need to specify the share of new vehicle purchases that 
would be electric under a default policy in which there is no subsidy at all (or busi-
ness as usual). If the share would be 2 percent, we refer to this as the 2 percent BAU 
EV share case. We consider 1 percent, 2 percent, and 5 percent shares. Even at a 
5 percent share, the electricity used to charge the vehicles is a small percentage of 
the overall variation in electricity load (see online Appendix M). Given a 2 percent 
BAU EV share,  state-specific taxes have a deadweight loss of $92 million per year, 
and uniform federal taxes have a deadweight loss of $191 million per year.52 This 
implies a gain from differentiation of $100 million (moving from federal to state) 
and of $191 million (moving from federal to county). The middle and right columns 
of panel A in Table 6 show differentiated policies in which there is only a single 
tax on one of the fuels. The  second-best single tax is smaller than the Pigovian tax, 
because consumers can avoid taxation by substituting into the untaxed vehicle (see 
online Appendix L). For single tax policies, the gains from differentiation are on the 
order of $25–$200 million. However, the deadweight losses are large particularly for 
taxes on electric miles only ($1.7 billion). The last three rows of panel A in Table 6 
50 The Department of Energy maintains a database of alternative fuels policies by state (http://www.afdc.
energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=tech). A few states impose a special registration fee for electric vehicles. Our data 
accounts for policies in place on July 28, 2014. 
51 See online Appendix K for more details. 
52 For context, annual vehicle sales are approximately 15 million in the United States. 
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show differentiated taxes based on native damages. The gains from differentiation 
are small or even negative. These policies lead to large deadweight losses ($0.7– 
$1.5 billion), because taxes based on native damages are much too low.
Panel B in Table 6 shows the deadweight losses for differentiated electric vehicle 
purchase subsidies. Gains from differentiation are relatively small: on the order of 
$10–$60 million at a 2 percent BAU EV share. These gains are much smaller than 
the gains from differentiation of VMT taxes. The distribution of environmental ben-
efits is right skewed. Because the probability of adopting the gas vehicle is close to 
one, it follows from Proposition 2 that this skewness leads to an increase in the gains 
from differentiation. Deadweight losses from electric vehicle subsidies are large: 
around $1.8 billion per year. Electric vehicle subsidies based on native damages 
have similarly large deadweight losses and small gains from differentiation.
Finally, panel B in Table 6 shows the deadweight loss from the current federal 
policy of a $7,500 subsidy on the purchase on an electric vehicle and the deadweight 
loss from the default  no-subsidy policy. The deadweight loss from the current fed-
eral subsidy is $3.4 billion per year at a 2 percent BAU EV share. This exceeds the 
deadweight loss from the  no-subsidy policy by $1.6 billion per year. The BAU EV 
shares shown in the table represent plausible shares in the near future and are appro-
priate for evaluating policy looking forward. To evaluate the recent past, we calculate 
deadweight losses of the two policies for a BAU EV share of 0.375 percent which 
is consistent with the actual 2014 electric vehicle market share of approximately 
Table 6—Deadweight Losses of Differentiated VMT Taxes and Differentiated Purchase Subsidies
Gas and electric tax Gas tax only Electric tax only
BAU EV share BAU EV share BAU EV share
Panel A. Deadweight losses 
percent percent percent
of differentiated VMT taxes 1 2 5 1 2 5 1 2 5
County policies 0 0 0 201 391 905 1,709 1,717 1,740
State policies 89 92 102 289 482 1,005 1,712 1,721 1,752
Federal policies 162 191 277 343 542 1,095 1,736 1,770 1,874
County (native) 989 1,073 1,325
State (native) 1,067 1,153 1,412
Federal (native) 778 809 903
BAU EV share
percent
Panel B. Deadweight losses of differentiated electric vehicle purchase subsidies 1 2 5
County policies 1,754 1,806 1,960
State policies 1,758 1,815 1,983
Federal policies (−$1,095 subsidy) 1,783 1,864 2,107
County policies (native damages) 1,788 1,874 2,134
State policies (native damages) 1,792 1,881 2,152
Federal policies (native damages) 1,785 1,868 2,188
Current federal policy ($7,500 subsidy) 2,581 3,459 6,079
BAU federal policy (zero subsidy) 1,791 1,880 2,148
Notes: Deadweight loss in millions of dollars per year is based on 15 million annual vehicle sales normalized to the 
emissions profile of the Ford Focus. The BAU EV share is the proportion of electric vehicles sold if there were no 
subsidy. This share is determined by the assumed value for  μ (10,664, 10,508, 10,037) which is proportional to the 
standard deviation of the unobserved relative preference shock. In panel A, federal taxes in the joint tax case are 
1.9 cents per mile on gasoline miles and 2.6 cents per mile on electric miles. 
3723holland et al.: environmental Benefits of electric vehiclesvol. 106 no. 12
0.75 percent.53 The deadweight loss from the current federal subsidy is $2.0 billion 
and the deadweight loss from the  no-subsidy policy is $1.7 billion. Regardless of 
BAU EV share, the current federal subsidy has larger deadweight loss than the no 
subsidy policy. And the welfare difference between the two polices increases sub-
stantially as the BAU EV share increases.
D. Sensitivity Analysis
Our analysis takes data from a number of different sources, uses estimated coef-
ficients from regressions in the electricity model and the AP2 model, and makes 
assumptions about variables such as charging behavior and the effects of tempera-
ture on electric vehicle range. Although there is uncertainty associated with each 
of these factors, we do not attempt to assign standard errors to our results. Instead 
we perform a sensitivity analysis to see the effects of various deviations from our 
baseline model.54
The first parameter that we explore in Table 7 is the social cost of carbon (SCC). 
Our baseline value is $41. A higher value for the SCC leads to higher damage esti-
mates for both electric and gasoline vehicles, but the environmental benefits are not 
highly sensitive to the assumed SCC.
Several of our assumptions affect only one type of vehicle. On the electric side, 
our baseline calculation makes a temperature adjustment to account for the reduced 
performance of electric vehicles in weather extremes and uses the EPRI charging 
profile. Table 7 shows that our results are not sensitive to these choices. On the gaso-
line side, our baseline calculation differentiates the mpg of gasoline vehicles by city 
and highway driving and assumes emissions throughout the lifetime of the vehicle 
are the same as when new. Using an average mpg instead leads to slightly lower 
gasoline vehicle damages. Doubling emissions rates for local pollutants primarily 
affects the upper tail of the gasoline vehicle damages and hence the upper tail of the 
environmental benefits.
Another set of assumptions relate to parameters in the AP2 model. In particular, 
in the baseline case, AP2 uses a VSL of approximately $8.1 million. A lower VSL 
of about $2.7 million leads to lower damages for both electric and gasoline vehicles 
and hence a narrower distribution for the environmental benefits. Another important 
parameter in AP2 is the  dose-response function that links PM2.5 exposure to adult 
mortality. We find that a higher dose response parameter leads to higher damages for 
both vehicles which widens the distribution of environmental benefits.
The next calculation examines changes to the electricity grid and the gasoline 
vehicle fleet. Our baseline uses observed power plant emissions in 2010–2012 to 
estimate the damages from electric vehicles. New air pollution and climate regula-
tions on power plants will likely lead to lower emissions in the future. In addition, 
there is an ongoing transition from coal plants to gas plants. For a rough estimate of 
these effects, we model a power grid in which all of the  coal-fired power plants are 
replaced with new  gas-fired power plants. This procedure implies that the replace-
ment plants would be in the same locations and would be dispatched identically to 
53 Li et al. (forthcoming) estimate that 50 percent of electric vehicle sales are due to the subsidy. 
54 Additional sensitivity for the welfare analysis is in online Appendix K. 
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the old  coal-fired plants.55 Turning to the gasoline vehicle fleet, our baseline uses 
the gasoline Ford Focus as the comparison vehicle to the electric Ford Focus. New 
regulations on gasoline vehicles will likely lead to lower emissions in the future. 
For a rough estimate of these effects, we use the Toyota Prius as a proxy for the 
vehicle of the future. The effect of these changes on the environmental benefits of 
electric vehicles is given by the “Future grid and vehicle” row in Table 7. Damages 
from both vehicles are lower, and damages from electric vehicles are much lower. 
However the mean environmental benefits of 0.56 cents per mile implies an electric 
vehicle subsidy of $840, which is still substantially less than current subsidies.
Finally, we consider statistical uncertainty associated with the marginal damages 
produced by AP2 for both gas and electric vehicles. The procedure is described in 
online Appendix I. The results using the fifth and  ninety-fifth percentiles for the 
damages are reported in Table 7.
IV. Caveats and Other Considerations
There are several important caveats to our calculation of the environmental 
benefits of an electric vehicle due to decreased air pollution emissions. First, we 
55 Modeling different plant locations and a new load curve is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Here 
we scale the  plant-specific coefficients for coal plants by a ratio. The numerator is the average emissions rate for 
combined cycle gas turbine plants that started operating after 2007, namely their total emissions in 2010 over their 
total net generation that year. The denominator is a similar emissions rate for each coal plant in our sample that is 
not a  co-generation plant. 
Table 7—Sensitivity Analysis of Damages and Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile for 2014 
Electric and Gasoline Ford Focus
Electric vehicle Gasoline vehicle Environmental benefits
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Baseline 2.59 0.67 4.72 1.86 1.03 4.32 −0.73 −3.63 3.16
Carbon cost
 SCC = $51 2.80 0.80 5.02 2.18 1.28 4.67 −0.62 −3.68 3.38
 SCC = $31 2.37 0.55 4.42 1.53 0.78 3.98 −0.84 −3.58 2.95
No temperature adjustment 2.43 0.67 3.90 1.86 1.03 4.32 −0.57 −2.84 3.18
Flat charging profile 2.41 0.74 3.88 1.86 1.03 4.32 −0.55 −2.79 3.10
Average mpg 2.59 0.67 4.72 1.74 1.23 4.11 −0.85 −3.42 2.89
Double gasoline emission rates 2.59 0.67 4.72 2.39 1.05 7.24 −0.20 −3.58 5.60
$2.7 Million VSL 1.61 0.71 2.64 1.54 1.02 2.55 −0.06 −1.59 1.63
PM dose response 3.74 1.25 6.89 2.16 1.04 5.96 −1.58 −5.76 3.91
Future grid & vehicle 0.67 0.37 1.39 1.23 0.74 3.53 0.56 −0.57 2.73
High estimates  ∗ 2.65 0.69 4.46 2.13 1.15 3.90 −0.52 −2.86 2.36
Low estimates  ∗ 2.53 0.68 4.15 1.59 0.78 2.90 −0.94 −3.12 1.87
Notes: Baseline corresponds to Ford Focus row from panel A in Table 2. Carbon cost uses a social cost of car-
bon of $51 or $31. No temperature adjustment assumes electric vehicle range is independent of temperature. Flat 
charging profile assumes electric vehicle charging occurs equally in all hours. Average mpg uses the average mpg 
for the gasoline vehicle regardless of where it is driven. Double gasoline emissions rates doubles the gasoline vehi-
cle emissions rates for local pollutants. $2.7 Million VSL assumes the VSL is $2.7 million instead of the baseline 
$8.1 million. PM dose response assumes a higher PM2.5 adult-mortality dose-response from Roman et al. (2008). 
Future grid & vehicle assumes all coal-fired power plants replaced by identically dispatched natural gas plants and 
a Toyota Prius gasoline vehicle. High estimates assumes ninety-fifth percentile damages for all local pollutants for 
all counties. Low estimates assumes fifth percentile damages for all local pollutants for all counties.  ∗  indicates the 
min and max counties are replaced by the fifth and ninety-fifth percentile counties. 
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have only considered air pollution emissions associated with driving the vehicles. 
There are other “upstream” environmental externalities associated with electric and 
gasoline vehicles.56 It is unlikely, however, that these upstream externalities have 
the same degree of heterogeneity found in the air pollution emissions from driv-
ing. So the effect of including them would likely be a shift in the distribution of 
 second-best subsidies but not a significant change in the variance of this distribu-
tion. Previous research has shown that electric vehicles have approximately $1,500 
greater upstream externalities than gasoline vehicles (Michalek et al. 2011).57
Second, our analysis is based on a simple snapshot of the electricity grid in the 
years 2010–2012. We might expect the grid to become cleaner over time by integrat-
ing new  lower-emission fuels and technologies. Of course, gasoline vehicles may 
become cleaner over time as well. The overall effect on the environmental benefits 
of electric vehicles will depend on the relative rates of changes of these two factors. 
Table 7 has an analysis of a future grid, but it is important to stress that our estimates 
are based on the dispatch and emissions of the electricity grid in 2010–2012.
Third, we focus on the marginal emissions from an increase in the demand for 
electric power due to electric vehicles charging. This is appropriate when the elec-
tricity demand for electric vehicles is a small fraction of overall electricity use. In 
online Appendix M, we discuss large scale adoption of electric vehicles.
Fourth, we analyze the environmental benefits of electric vehicles in isolation 
from other environmental regulations. In practice, these regulations may impact the 
market for vehicles and/or the electricity market, and hence have an effect on the 
environmental benefits of electric vehicles.58
Some regulations will have a negative effect on the environmental benefits of 
electric vehicles. Consider the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. 
CAFE stipulates that the  sales-weighted harmonic mean of mpg for a given man-
ufacturer’s fleet of vehicles must meet a certain requirement. Electric vehicles are 
assigned a mpg value for this calculation. These values are much larger than any 
existing gasoline vehicle. Assuming that the CAFE requirement is initially binding, 
selling an electric vehicle enables manufacturers to meet a lower standard for the 
rest of their fleet. Let the  CAFE-induced environmental cost of an electric vehicle 
be defined as the increase in environmental damage from the rest of the fleet when 
an electric vehicle is sold. In online Appendix N, we determine the  CAFE-induced 
environmental cost and show that the  second-best subsidy on the purchase of an 
electric vehicle is decreased by the amount of the  CAFE-induced environmental 
cost. Applying our baseline values for the Ford Focus, the  CAFE-induced environ-
mental cost is $1,555 per vehicle.59 This value is significant in comparison with even 
the largest  second-best subsidy for an electric vehicle found in our study ($2,785, 
in California).
56 These include emissions from making vehicles and batteries, extracting oil, refining gasoline, transporting 
gasoline to retail stations, mining coal and natural gas, and transporting these resources to electric plants. 
57 See online Appendix O. See also Tamayao et al. (2015) and the references therein. 
58 In addition, there may be  preexisting distortions in both the electricity market (e.g., regulatory pricing policy) 
and the gasoline market (e.g., OPEC). 
59 A more thorough analysis would use a complete model of both supply and demand for the entire new vehicle 
market and relax our assumption of constant prices. See also Jenn, Azevedo, and Michalek (2016). 
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Other regulations, such as cap-and-trade programs and renewable portfolio stan-
dards (RPS), will have a positive effect on the environmental benefits. EPA pro-
grams cap emissions of NOx and SO2, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
caps emissions of CO2 in the Northeast. In our model of the electricity market, we 
determine the marginal increase in emissions due to an increase in electricity con-
sumption. We do not model the constraint that power plant emissions are capped. 
During the period of our analysis, permit prices were exceedingly low in many mar-
kets, especially those for SO2. In all permit markets, the stock of banked allowances 
was increasing significantly despite low prices. This suggests that the cap may not 
have been binding in these markets.60 Nevertheless, in online Appendix P, we per-
form calculations to approximate the effect of binding caps. Under the assumption 
that caps on NOx , SOx, and CO2 are all binding, damages from an electric vehicle 
decrease from 2.59 cents per mile to 0.94 cents per mile (with 92 percent of this 
decrease due to the cap on SO2). Equivalently, the  second-best subsidy increases 
from −$1,095 to $1,380. Turning to RPS, these programs require a fixed percentage 
of electricity be produced by low emission technologies such as solar and wind. In a 
region with a RPS, an increase in the electricity load will result in a increase in low 
emission generation. Therefore, electric vehicle damages can be scaled by  1 − R , 
where  R is the RPS share, if the renewables operate at the same time and location 
as EV charging.
In addition to the environmental benefits studied in our paper, there are a variety 
of other considerations that are put forth in favor of electric vehicle subsidies. First, 
reducing the consumption of oil may generate  geopolitical benefits, reduced military 
expenditures, and economic benefits from insulation to oil price shocks. Michalek 
et al. (2011) determined these benefits to be approximately $1,400. Notice that this 
number has about the same magnitude, but the opposite sign, as the difference in 
upstream externalities between electric and gasoline vehicles.
Second, electric vehicle subsidies may be justified due to innovation spillovers. If 
innovation is a public good, then markets may provide too little innovation. Similarly, 
the inability of firms to appropriate the full gains from innovation (e.g., consumers 
may also benefit) may reduce innovation incentives. Our analysis cannot speak to 
the appropriateness of these justifications for electric vehicle subsidies. However, it 
is worth noting that electric vehicle subsidies are a “demand pull” innovation policy 
and hence are subject to all the limitations of demand pull policies (Jaffe, Newell, 
and Stavins 2005).
Third, subsidizing electric vehicles today helps boost demand, which in turn 
increases incentives to provide electric vehicle charging infrastructure.61 The 
increase in demand may also lead to lower production costs in the future due to 
learning by doing. Both of these effects increase adoption in the future, which will 
presumably be desirable due to a cleaner electric grid. This argument may indeed 
have merit, but any such  long-term benefits may be at least partially offset by the 
 short-term costs associated with current electric vehicle use. Our analysis provides 
an estimate of these costs.
60 A  nonbinding cap may still yield positive permit prices due to transactions costs. 
61 Li et al. (forthcoming) examine the relative effectiveness of the current policy with alternative policies aimed 
at building out the charging network. 
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V. Conclusion
The comparison of environmental externalities from driving gasoline and electric 
vehicles depends critically on damages from local pollution. Ignoring local pollu-
tion leads to an overestimate of the benefits of electric vehicles and an underestimate 
of the geographic heterogeneity. Accounting for both global and local pollution, we 
find electric vehicles generate negative environmental benefits of 0.73 cents per mile 
on average relative to comparable gasoline vehicles. There is considerable variation 
around this average: electric vehicles used in Los Angeles, California produce ben-
efits of 3.2 cents per mile while those used in Grand Forks, North Dakota produce 
benefits of −3.1 cents per mile. On average, electric vehicles driven in metropolitan 
areas generate benefits of about $0.01 per mile while those driven outside metropol-
itan areas generate benefits of −1.7 cents per mile.
These findings raise questions regarding the sign, the magnitude, and the 
 one-size-fits-all nature of the uniform federal subsidy of $7,500 for purchasing a 
pure electric vehicle. Our results imply subsidies of −$1,095 on average with a 
range from $2,785 in California to −$4,964 in North Dakota. Thus environmental 
benefits from driving cannot, alone, justify the federal subsidy. As discussed above, 
other studies have estimated upstream environmental benefits of electric vehicles of 
about −$1,500 and have estimated benefits of $1,400 due to reduced oil consump-
tion. Combining these three factors cannot justify the federal subsidy. It remains an 
open question as to whether or not additional considerations (such as innovation 
spillovers, network effects, or learning by doing) generate enough benefits to justify 
the federal subsidy.
At first blush, our finding of significant geographic heterogeneity in benefits sug-
gests a need for local discretion. However, the pollution export phenomena we iden-
tify calls into question whether or not local regulation would be effective. In most 
states, when a consumer opts for an electric vehicle rather than a gasoline vehicle, 
they reduce air pollution in their state. However, in all but 11 states, this purchase 
makes society as a whole worse off because electric vehicles tend to export air pol-
lution to other states more than gasoline vehicles. Given this, states may implement 
subsidies even though a tax might be more appropriate. Hence there may be a need 
for federal policy to account for exported damages.
This suggests the appropriate policy for electric vehicles should be at the fed-
eral level, but differentiated by location. We find that differentiated Pigovian taxes 
on miles lead to greater welfare gains than differentiated subsidies on vehicle pur-
chases. This is not surprising, as economists have long recognized the superiority 
of putting a direct price on externalities relative to other indirect corrective policies. 
Unfortunately, this insight does not seem to have had much influence on policy, as 
political decision makers often implement indirect policies instead. A consequence 
of this predilection is that multiple indirect policies may target the same externali-
ties, as is the case with CAFE standards and purchase subsidies on electric vehicles. 
In our analysis, the interaction of these policies lead additional costs of $1,555 per 
vehicle.
Public policy evaluation is especially difficult and important in contexts charac-
terized by: (i) strong prior beliefs as to the merits of the policy and/or its targeted 
outcome; (ii) complex interactions among economic and physical systems; and 
3728 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW dECEMbER 2016
(iii) economically significant outcomes. The federal policy which encourages the 
purchase of electric vehicles exhibits each of these traits. Although we have focused 
on vehicles, there is a broader trend toward electrification of a variety of forms of 
transportation. Our methodology, which combines  discrete-choice models, distrib-
uted electricity generation, and air pollution models, may yield a useful template for 
further analysis of the environmental consequences of this trend.
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